Emory International Law Review
Volume 34

Issue 4

2020

Jinping and the Beanstalk: The Tale of Feuding International
Giants and How the Planting of Agricultural Tariffs Cultivated a
Trade War
Amy Jicha

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Amy Jicha, Jinping and the Beanstalk: The Tale of Feuding International Giants and How the Planting of
Agricultural Tariffs Cultivated a Trade War, 34 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1033 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol34/iss4/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

JICHA_5.26.20

5/26/2020 3:10 PM

JINPING AND THE BEANSTALK: THE TALE OF FEUDING
INTERNATIONAL GIANTS AND HOW THE PLANTING OF
AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS CULTIVATED A TRADE WAR
INTRODUCTION
Agriculture has consistently received protections dating all the way back to
Ancient Greece, a time when the Greek government would punish an individual
who made a serious mistake pertaining to agriculture by death.1 Food is one of
life’s necessities that is critical for maintaining a sustainable life, both for
organisms and overall development.2 Take China’s soybean imports from the
United States for example: the oil seed is used for animal feed, human
consumption, cooking oil, and other products.3
Unfortunately, the need for food makes for a strategy that hurts innocent
people in an effort to win a relentless trade war. Specifically, the media coverage
of the 2018 Trade War between the United States and China has incited fear in
citizens by warning of increased prices for several everyday products.4 But what
some of the media fails to emphasize is that as the trade war progresses, the U.S.
agricultural industry is fighting a daunting trade deficit and bringing down the
U.S. economy.5 The United States has seen a twenty percent reduction in the
farming industry’s profit from China’s tariff, or tax, imposed on U.S. soybeans
alone.6 Food not only drives animal life, but also the life of the international and
U.S. economies as well.7

1
Destaw A. Yigzaw, WTO Agricultural Trade and the Unfulfilled Promise of Development, 11 S.C. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 163, 168 (2015) (citing P. Spitz, The Right to Food for Peoples and for the People: A Historical
Perspective, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 169, 173–74 (P. Alston & K. Tomagevski eds., 1984)).
2
Yigzaw, supra note 1 at 170.
3
Megan Durisin & Sam Dodge, Why Soybeans Are at the Heart of the U.S.-China Trade War,
BLOOMBERG, (July 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-soybean-tariff/ (explaining that
soybeans, an oilseed, are critical to Chinese life and provide for several different parts of life in China).
4
Bob Bryan, Trump’s Tariffs are About to Hit You Where It Really Hurts, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tariff-china-trade-war-consumer-goods-2018-9.
5
Durisin & Dodge, supra note 3; Bill Chappell, Agriculture Department Will Pay $4.7 Billion to
Farmers Hit in the Trade War, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/28/
642525831/agriculture-dept-will-pay-4-7-billion-to-farmers-hit-in-trade-war (explaining that the aid package
will further contribute to the deficit).
6
Chappell, supra note 5.
7
Catherine Boudreau, How China Will Target U.S. Agriculture, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/04/how-china-will-target-us-agriculture-458530 (explaining that U.S.
agriculture comprises a large amount of U.S. exports and China is the main benefactor of those agricultural
exports).
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Consequently, the world is left to reconcile the raging trade war between two
of its top economies. The United States and China consistently struggle to find
a common ground through their attempts at negotiating a solution, but the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has offered to step in if the parties are willing.8
While the WTO may be able to mediate some of the trade issues, the
Organization may not be equipped to tackle China’s unique economic structure.
Therefore, the 2018 Trade War between the world’s economic powers may spark
a reevaluation of WTO rules among treaty members, so the WTO can be better
suited for complaints which concern an evolving world economy of technology.9
In 1994, the United States and European Union spearheaded the creation of
the WTO at the Uruguay Round of negotiations concerning international trade.10
Specifically, the negotiations covered the regulation of international trade,
improvement of market access, and the establishment of a system to better
resolve disputes.11 The Uruguay Round was unique in that it was the first time
that the world witnessed the implementation of technological protections.12 The
Uruguay Round presented a forum for international intellectual property rights
and protections of said rights to be negotiated as part of the WTO.13
China joined the WTO in 2001, and has since made its presence known in
the international community by its participation in approximately 190 cases and
numerous propositions to the WTO.14 Despite China’s international advocacy
through the WTO, the sovereign has domestically violated several aspects of
international trade in its short tenure, and it has undermined the rule of law. Yet,
the United States and other countries fail to hold China accountable.15 Most
importantly, the United States claims that China has consistently stolen U.S.
8
Larry Elliot, WTO Head Offers to Mediate Between China and US Over Trade War, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/19/wto-head-offers-to-mediate-betweenchina-and-us-over-trade-war; John Schoen and Jacob Pramuk, This Timeline Shows How the US-China Trade
War Led to the Latest Round of Talks in Beijing, CNBC (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/04/
timeline-of-us-china-trade-war-and-trump-tariffs-as-talks-in-beijing-start.html (explaining that preexisting
tariffs are still imposed but there is a truce regarding more tariffs as a potential agreement is negotiated over the
course of three months).
9
Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 261
(2016).
10
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
11
Id.
12
DAVID NIMMER, 5 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 18.06 (2019).
13
Id.
14
Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 115, 127 (2018).
15
Brad W. Setser, U.S.-China Trade War: How We Got Here, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (July 9,
2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-china-trade-war-how-we-got-here.
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intellectual property (IP) rights and is therefore attempting to handle the IP
issues with China on its own, without international dispute resolution
mechanisms.16 This includes imposing tariffs in response to the IP theft and
justifying the tariffs by alleging that the theft is a threat to U.S. national
security.17 Both countries are implementing protectionist trade policies in an
attempt to settle the score for trade abuses and further protect their respective
economies.18
This Comment suggests that the WTO is the proper channel for resolving
this international dispute to prevent a growing trade deficit and international
agricultural waste. But to be effective, the disputing member countries should
file a claim with the WTO.19 Thus, the United States should file its own
complaint with the WTO regarding China’s targeted tariffs on U.S. agriculture.
The country must also deliver on its promise to enforce WTO regulations, rather
than take matters into its own hands and allow the trade war to fester. In turn,
the WTO has a daunting challenge to face because the IP abuses that the United
States claims against China get to the root of China’s unique economic
structure.20 China filed a complaint against the United States for its actions and
the United States will likely justify its tariffs by alleging the national security
defense.21
Additionally, the WTO will likely have to discern whether the Chinese
tariffs against U.S. agriculture were justified. The spark of the trade war can be
attributed to IP theft and soybeans, along with other U.S. agricultural products,
that fell victim to tariffs.22 The agricultural tariffs require recourse because they

16

Id.
Riley Walters, Is the China Trade War Legal?, HILL (Sept. 28, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/
international/409012-is-the-china-trade-war-legal.
18
Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States with Implications for
International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L. L. & ECON. 539, 540 (1993); Trade Wars, Trump Tariffs
and Protectionism Explained, (July 26, 2018), BBC NEWS, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43512098; Wes
(July
18,
2018),
Peterson,
Who
Wins
Trade
Wars?,
FARMFUTURES
https://www.farmfutures.com/commentary/who-wins-trade-wars.
19
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
20
Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, TIME (June 28, 2016), http://time.com/4386335/donaldtrump-trade-speech-transcript/; see Part II.C.
21
Doug Palmer, US Sides with Russia in WTO National Security Case Against Ukraine, POLITICO
(July 30, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/us-sides-with-russia-in-wto-national-security-case-againstukraine; see also Marc Busch, Trump Claims that a National Security Exception Allows Him to Block Imports.
Is He Right?, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/
11/trump-claims-that-a-national-security-exception-allows-him-to-block-imports-is-he-right/?utm_term=.1d0
b1e98fe3d.
22
What’s at Stake in the U.S.-China Agricultural-Trade War, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/whats-at-stake-in-the-u-s-china-agricultural-trade-war-1538532060.
17
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violate both the Agreement on Agriculture and the U.S.-China Bilateral
Concession Agreement which were created prior to China’s WTO
participation.23 Lastly, it is difficult to determine how the WTO would handle
the United States’ national security defense,24 but the WTO may ultimately hold
in favor of the United States because the United States did not act illegally
according to domestic laws.25 In essence, this Comment intends to provide a
solution for the ongoing trade deficit in the U.S. agricultural industry to further
prevent international inefficiency and waste.
Even if the WTO rejects the United States’ justification that it began
imposing tariffs for national security purposes, the WTO would have to
reconcile China’s state-run data-sharing and determine how to limit Chinese
state access in international trade to prevent further IP theft. This Comment
suggests that the WTO lacks a first impression regarding the United States’
claims of China’s IP theft. However, the WTO could use this opportunity to set
new precedent by establishing new policies or inspire another negotiation round.
This Comment provides a solution to the ongoing trade war between China
and the United States which is negatively affecting the United States’
agricultural industry. Part I explores the current issue in the international
community. Part II discusses the history of protectionism, its place in
international trade, and how the philosophy has made a comeback since the time
of The Great Depression. Further, Part II uses the backdrop of protectionist
policies to explain the initiation of trade wars, the start of the WTO, and China’s
accession to the WTO. Part III examines the current trade war between the
United States and China to better understand how the trade war has progressed
and provides some insight regarding why agriculture is targeted. Part IV explains
why ameliorating the trade war is critical, theories on how to fix it, and how the
WTO can use this hard-hitting case as a turning point toward fairness in
international trade.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Part discusses protectionist trade policies and historical repercussions
of their implementation. Although there are few notable trade wars, those
sparked by the United States have had devastating consequences and are most
23

See Part II.C.
Kellie Ell, Steel and Aluminum Tariffs are a ‘Complete Violation of WTO Rules’: Former Deputy Trade
Representative, CNBC (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/02/tariffs-a-complete-violation-of-wtorules-former-deputy-trade-rep.html.
25
Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. 2101 (2018).
24
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relatable to the 2018 Trade War. After exploring the history of trade wars, this
Section explains the history of the WTO and China’s arduous accession to the
Organization. Finally, the Part ends by explaining longstanding abuses that
underlie the tensions of the trade war.
A. Protectionism and the Historical Effects of a Trade War
Protectionism is the idea that a country must reduce imports, often by
imposing tariffs on goods, to boost that country’s industry, increase trade
revenue, and protect that country from foreign competition.26 In short, it is the
concept of placing one’s own country before any other country.27 Experts differ
in their views on protectionist measures and their efficacy, but history has shown
that protectionist trade policies worsen well-being in the countries that adopt
them and harm consumers and the industries that rely on imported products.28
Although protectionist measures are employed to protect a state’s own economy
and jobs, history shows that such measures result in more job loss and reduced
economic growth.29 Protectionist measures have the potential to destroy
relationships with international trading partners and restrict international trade.30
The current U.S. administration began imposing protectionist measures on
steel and aluminum so that U.S. companies would buy locally.31 But history
demonstrates that in the rare situations where protectionist policies may succeed,
success only results in certain industries.32 Moreover, where industries have to
pay more to compensate for their raw materials, the consumer pays the
difference.33 In turn, the countries who maintain trade relationships with the
tariff-imposing country retaliate with their own tariffs on that country’s
products, and thus create a “tit-for-tat” escalation known as a trade war.34
Trade wars are rare, but their presence in history have revealed devastating
ramifications. In 1930, Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Act, also known as
the Tariff Act of 1930, to counteract the drought that damaged a majority of U.S.

26
McGee, supra note 18 at 540; Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J.
1, 2 (2012).
27
Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, supra note 26, at 2; McGee, supra note 18, at 540.
28
McGee, supra note 18, at 540–42; Trade Wars, Trump Tariffs and Protectionism Explained, BBC
NEWS, (July 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43512098; Peterson, supra note 18.
29
McGee, supra note 18, at 565–66; Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, supra note 26, at 72.
30
Id.
31
Trade Wars, Trump Tariffs and Protectionism Explained, supra note 28.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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crops.35 President Hoover was quick to sign the Act into law because it
simultaneously provided him a way to support his campaign-promised agenda
to make trade fairer.36 Congress created the Act so the Executive could impose
large import tariffs on foreign goods and encourage U.S. citizens to support local
farmers.37 Hoover believed that U.S. agriculture relied too much on foreign
markets and therefore isolated the agricultural economy by strictly regulating
domestic production and imposing tariffs.38 In turn, the tariffs resulted in
increased food prices for Americans who were already suffering from The Great
Depression.39
Additionally, other countries retaliated with tariffs which decreased global
trade by sixty-five percent.40 Farmers comprised twenty-five percent of the U.S.
work force at the time, and food prices were already high as the world recovered
from World War I.41 President Hoover provided subsidies to farmers to assist
with the lacking trade and growing deficit.42 Thus, the increasing tariffs
exacerbated the effects of the Great Depression in the agricultural industry even
more, and worsened the livelihood of the American people.43 Some economists
claim that these protectionist trade measures were similarly embraced around
the world and propelled the start of World War II.44 The economic crises
underlying World War II led to some coalescence in international trade at the
conclusion of the wars.

35
Chantal Thomas, Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States, 41 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 1, 6 (2004); Kimberly Amadeo, What the Smoot Hawley Act Can Teach Protectionists Today,
BALANCE (June 4, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/smoot-hawley-tariff-lessons-today-4136667.
36
Amadeo, supra note 35.
37
Id; Thomas, supra note 35.
38
Jon Lauck, Against the Grain: The North Dakota Wheat Pooling Plan and the Liberalization Trend in
World Agricultural Markets, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 289, 295 (1999).
39
Amadeo, supra note 35.
40
Id; Thomas, supra note 35 at 5–6.
41
Amadeo, supra note 35.
42
Id.
43
Id; Theodore Phalan et al., The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression, (Feb. 29, 2012),
FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., https://fee.org/articles/the-smoot-hawley-tariff-and-the-great-depression/; Thomas,
supra note 35, at 5.
44
Ben Chu, How We Can Learn From the History of Protectionism, INDEPENDENT (June 6, 2018),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/protectionism-history-how-learn-trump-trade-tariff-lawsmoot-hawley-a8384216.html; Jaden Urbi, One of the Biggest US Trade Wars of the Past Had a Tragic
Consequence – Here’s What Happened, CNBC (June 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/01/one-of-thebiggest-us-trade-wars-of-the-past-had-a-tragic-consequence—heres-what-happened.html. Contra Todd Tucker,
Did Smoot-Hawley Bring Ragnarok?, MEDIUM (Mar. 21, 2018), https://medium.com/@toddntucker/did-smoothawley-bring-ragnarok-211642544b6e

ON
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1. The Chicken Trade War
In the 1962 Chicken War, the United States exploited a German market that
elected to import and buy several U.S. frozen chickens at an unbeatable price.45
Despite preexisting tariffs that Germany imposed on imports, the U.S.
maintained a large profitability for its chicken exports to Germany throughout
the late 1950s.46 Nonetheless, the low-cost U.S. chickens took away from the
European market, which was closely regulated by the European Economic
Community (EEC).47 The EEC implemented a system of import-regulations and
imposed tariffs on U.S. chickens.48 The additional EEC tariffs revealed
protectionist tendencies because they favorably restricted trade and imports
among European countries.49 The harshest effects of the trade war were
projected to happen in the year following implementation of the system.50 U.S.
agricultural exports were down by $1.2 billion because of the EEC tariffs in that
year.51
Although the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided
some protections from the dangers of tariffs imposed on agricultural imports and
exports, the EEC found a way to unbind the contractual demands from the GATT
tariff guidelines (“schedules”).52 The states comprising the EEC unbound
themselves through Article XXVIII, which allowed the formation of a “Customs
Union” that permitted states to unify and replace previous rate commitments
with the Union’s own tariff rates.53 Nevertheless, the GATT demanded that in
such a Union, affected parties had negotiating rights before tariffs took effect
and the Union had to reach an agreement over the proposed new tariffs taking
effect over six months.54 The EEC, as a Customs Union, negotiated with its
various trading partners for at least eighteen months each.55 The tariffs would
have collectively affected half of U.S. exports to EEC-affiliated countries. Even
though most tariffs were successfully negotiated, U.S. agricultural products
made up ten percent of U.S. trade and were expected to receive no remedy.56
45

Herman Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 671, 671 (1964).
Id.
47
Id. at 672–73 (stating that, at the time, the EEC was comprised of France, Germany. Italy, and the
Benelux); see also Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4.
48
Walker, supra note 45, at 672.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 673.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 674–75.
55
Id.
56
Id.
46
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The United States and Germany could not come to an agreement before
implementation of the tariff regime, so both parties called upon the GATT’s
Council of Representatives to provide a panel and administer an advisory
opinion regarding U.S. poultry exports.57 The United States argued under an
exception found in Article XXVIII of the GATT Treaty that the United States
was the “principal supplier” of poultry to Germany and Germany could not
unbind itself from the GATT tariff schedules for this reason.58 The panel
provided a report describing U.S. valuation for loss of exports under the EEC’s
tariffs, but did not provide an opinion on the law that gave rise to the claim or
an action recommendation.59 The United States used the panel report’s amount
from the loss of exports as the amount of tariffs it could impose on Germany out
of its own retaliation.60
The United States and Germany negotiated a solution before the United
States imposed its retaliating tariffs.61 The Chicken War showed the potential
for a devastating trade war between the United States and European nations left
to their own devices.62 The GATT panel was helpful in an advisory role by
providing a valuation of the loss in exports.63 However, the limited opinion and
remaining unanswered questions revealed the shortcomings of the GATT,
obviating the need for a dispute resolution body.64
2. The Banana Trade War
Later on in the 1990s, the EEC signed a five-year agreement to provide
preferential treatment for bananas that were originally exported from African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries.65 These areas encompass most of Europe’s
previous colonies.66 For this reason, analysts declare that the agreement was
riddled with protectionist policies to retain profitability resulting from
international trade among specific European countries and their affiliates.67 The
57

Id. at 678–79.
Id. at 677.
59
Id. at 679.
60
Id. at 681.
61
Id. at 682.
62
Id. at 682–83.
63
Id. at 683.
64
Id.
65
Zsolt Bessko, Going Bananas Over EEC Preferences?: A Look at the Banana Trade War and the
WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 265, 265–66 (1996) (at this time, Britain, Ireland, and Denmark acceded to the EEC).
66
Michelle Williams, Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana Trade War, 31 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 163, 167 (2000).
67
Id.
58
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favor toward these specific countries kept profitability high for EEC affiliates,
but negatively affected five banana-producing Latin American countries that
relied on the European market.68 After GATT negotiating principles failed, the
Latin American countries collectively filed a complaint through the GATT’s
Dispute Settlement Body.69 The panel decided that the EEC’s banana regime
violated several Articles of the GATT and soon-to-be implemented WTO.70
Nonetheless, the EEC expanded its preferences for its past colonies in other
ways. For example, the EEC removed all tariffs and duties on bananas exported
by African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries.71 In turn, the EEC provided all
other countries with restrictive quota licenses and twenty-percent tariffs on
banana exports.72 The Latin American countries responded with another
complaint at the GATT and the GATT’s dispute resolution body delivered an
opinion in favor of the Latin American countries.73 Even though the EEC
abolished its banana import regime before going to the GATT, the GATT
addressed the legality of the regime.74 The GATT held against the EEC and
called for removal of all collective trade restrictions because such unions were
inconsistent with free trade under the pending WTO.75 In addition to its findings,
the panel recommended that the two countries further negotiate a resolution to
the remaining portions of the banana regime.76
In addition to the Latin American countries, the Hawaiian banana industry
petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative alleging that the agreement between
the EEC and Latin American countries was discriminatory and a burden on U.S.
commerce.77 Section 301 of the U.S. Code allows the Trade Representative to
investigate complaints pertaining to practices that violate U.S. rights under any
trade agreement and any practices that are unjustifiable or a burden on U.S.
commerce.78 The United States then refers the situation to a GATT/WTO Panel
and that panel decides whether rights were violated.79 The mechanism is similar
to the procedure followed under specific articles from the GATT/WTO.80 As a
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 168.
Id. at 168, 170–71.
Id. at 168, 171.
Bessko, supra note 65, at 273.
Id.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id.
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result of the Representative’s investigation, the Representative consulted with
the EEC to withdraw from its proposed agreement with the Latin American
countries and to seek a solution through the dispute resolution body.81
B. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Trade Organization,
and China’s Accession
After World War II and the Chicken War, several countries came together
to form the GATT to establish global trade regulations and create a mechanism
for solving international trade disputes.82 World War II and the Chicken War
revealed the ramifications of nationalism and protectionist policies, and thus
several countries in the world wanted to prevent recurrence in the future.83
However, the GATT was merely provisional and required extensive revisions,
such as a more sustainable regulation to protect agriculture.84 Several round table
discussions took place to establish a sustainable international organization that
would be well-equipped to handle the changing world.85 Thus, the Uruguay
Round finalized the creation of the WTO.86 Additionally, Congress amended
federal trade law to align with the Uruguay Round agreements and replaced the
troublesome parts of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.87
Today, the WTO acts as the global trade body that facilitates regulations and
resolves trade disputes.88 States gathered to create the WTO with the intention
to prevent any future devastating trade wars similar to what sparked World War
II and the Chicken War.89 The WTO established a Dispute Settlement Body

81

Id. at 283.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; see Peterson,
supra note 18.
83
Peterson, supra note 18.
84
WORLD TRADE ORG., The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
THE WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm [hereinafter WORLD TRADE ORG.,
GATT Years]; See generally JANE M. PORTER & DOUGLAS E. BOWERS, AGRIC. & RURAL ECON. DIV., ECON.
RESEARCH SERV. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., A SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
(1989) (demonstrating the U.S.’ consistent fight for strict agriculture protections in the negotiating rounds
preceding the WTO’s creation).
85
WORLD TRADE ORG., GATT Years, supra note 84; see also Peter Tasker, Trade Wars—Lessons from
the 1980s, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., (Mar. 30, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Trade-wars-lessons-from-the1980s2 (advanced technologies in Japan, like IBM and computer memory, concerned the U.S. about industrial
espionage, thus fueling another trade war in the 1980s); Andy Kessler, Lessons From an ‘80s Trade War, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lessons-from-an-80s-trade-war-1538950192 (the
Japanese semiconductor industry was a great concern of the U.S. and lacked regulations).
86
WORLD TRADE ORG., GATT Years, supra note 84.
87
The Tariff Act of 1930, 7 U.S.C. §§ 701–783 (2012).
88
Peterson, supra note 18.
89
Id.
82
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(DSB) which has the authority to apply rules and procedures as covered in the
WTO’s Understanding document.90 Upon receiving a complaint from a member
state, the DSB may establish panels, adopt the panel reports that result from the
panels, authorize suspension of specific concessions, and monitor implemented
recommendations and rulings.91 These actions extend to agreements establishing
the WTO, including the Agreement on Agriculture, and any multilateral or
plurilateral trade agreements.92
One of the most noteworthy changes from the GATT to WTO is the stricter
limitation on unilateral action.93 The limitation is an attempt to encourage the
DSB as a multilateral system and to promote member states to rely on the DSB.94
A member state is unable to make its own determination that there was a
violation unless there is recourse explained through the dispute settlement
process or the state takes action that is consistent with the DSB’s adopted panel
reports.95 If a sovereign believes it has experienced a violation, the state must
receive DSB authorization before responding or retaliating against the alleged
violation.96 Since its inception, the WTO’s DSB has held against Indonesia,
Russia, and the U.S. in situations similar to the current tariffs imposed on U.S.
agricultural products.97 The results of these more recent cases show that the
WTO is not afraid to hold against international giants that violate international
trade agreements, including the Agreement on Agriculture.98
Scholars believe that the U.S. and EU began laying the foundation of the
WTO after the Cold War and used it to shift an international ideology of liberal
trade norms.99 Some economists believe that the protectionist policies espoused
before World War II influenced the formation of the WTO and that the WTO
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Bessko, supra note 65, at 288.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 291.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 292.
97
Panel Report, Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, WTO
Doc. WT/DS478/R (adopted Dec. 22, 2016); Panel Report, Russia—Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural
and Manufacturing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS485/R (adopted Aug. 12, 2016); Panel Report, United States –
Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WTO Doc. WT/DS343/R (adopted Feb. 29, 2008).
98
See generally, Panel Report, Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS478/R (adopted Dec. 22, 2016); see generally, Panel Report, Russia—Tariff
Treatment of Certain Agricultural and Manufacturing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS485/R (adopted Aug. 12,
2016); see generally, Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WTO Doc.
WT/DS343/R (adopted Feb. 29, 2008).
99
Shaffer & Gao, supra note 14, at 125.
91
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protects countries which exhibit protectionist policies.100 The Western makeup
of the WTO arguably barred China’s accession early on and pressured the
country to adopt western trade practices.101 Accession to the WTO happens in
two ways, dependent on whether the country seeking accession is a founding
party of the GATT or the country is not a founding member.102 China was a
founding member of the GATT and thus its accession to the WTO fell under
Article XXXII.103 Accession under Article XXXII is a two-step process that first
requires the applicant to negotiate a bilateral concession agreement with each
party of the WTO who asks for one. The second step demands that the applicant
state negotiate a protocol of accession to the WTO and its members, as a
whole.104
China had to jump through several hurdles in both steps because of its trade
barriers and inconsistent domestic practices at the time. Like most western
countries, China’s economic policy stemming from the 1960s embraced the
inward goal toward achieving self-reliance.105 The first step’s call for bilateral
deals meant that China had to make promises to each WTO member detailing
how China would open its market on a government-to-government basis with
that specific member.106 There is the option for countries to request a bilateral
deal but with a market like China’s, several countries had export interests in the
Chinese market.107 As a result, forty WTO members, including the United
States, made a request for bilateral deals, and such negotiations delayed the
second step of accession.108 The United States specifically emphasized market
access for agricultural goods and intellectual property in its deal with China.109
The United States and China agreed to decrease tariffs and phase out all tariffs
on soybeans.110 Again, this was just one of forty bilateral agreements that China

100

Yigzaw, supra note 1, at 223.
Shaffer & Gao, supra note 14, at 127.
102
Raj Bhala, International Economic Law: Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga,
15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469, 1472 (2000).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1472–73.
105
Pasha L. Hsieh, China-United States Trade Negotiations and Disputes: The WTO and Beyond, 4 ASIAN
J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 369, 373 (2009).
106
Bhala, supra note 102, at 1472–73.
107
Id. at 1473.
108
Id.
109
Agreement on Market Access Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of
America, China-U.S., Nov. 15, 1999, U.N.T.S. [hereinafter Market Access Agreement]; Press Release, Office
of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Releases Details on U.S.-China Consensus on China’s WTO
Accession (June 14, 2001) (on file with author).
110
See Market Access Agreement, supra note 109.
101
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had to negotiate with the members of the WTO who requested a deal before
China could take the next step toward accession.111
The second step required the WTO members to agree on China’s accession
and then draft separate protocol that all the members agreed would allow China’s
actual accession.112 Generally, the protocol in any given case outlines the
applicant’s most recent trade policies and compares those laws to the minimum
WTO requirements.113 The protocol aims to identify points of inconsistency, and
members work with applicants to establish an agenda detailing the applicant’s
intention and schedule to implement the necessary changes.114 If an accessionseeking sovereign is a developing country, it can accede to the WTO with
reduced obligations or “special and differential treatment.”115 This allows the
developing country to suspend certain obligations so it can meet economic
pressures, or to phase in obligations over a longer period.116
Essentially, China’s accession was conditioned by each member’s bilateral
agreement, and then accession was conditioned on final rules that all members
believed China had to meet before acceding. The first step had to be
accomplished because unsatisfied members would have been able to block the
vote on deciding whether China could move to the second and final step.117
China negotiated enough to move to the next step and protocol negotiations.118
In total, China abolished or amended 2,600 statutes and regulations because they
were inconsistent with the WTO’s accession agreement.119 China also passed
legislation on new issues, including intellectual property.120 China’s entry into
the WTO resulted in at least a thirty-eight percent increase in Chinese exports,
but entry as a developing country would require a larger increase because of the
benefit of reduced obligations; thus, China advocated for special and differential
treatment as a developing country.121

111

See Bhala, supra note 102, at 1473.
Id. (noting that these steps are demonstrated in direct application to China but are required for every
sovereign that wishes to accede).
113
Id. at 1474.
114
See id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1481.
117
Id. at 1474.
118
Id.
119
Neil Hughes, A Trade War with China, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 94, 99 (2005).
120
Id.
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See Bhala, supra note 102, at 1479–80.
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Although China argued for status as a developing country, the United States
and other members advocated against this.122 China’s market was already
booming with its current production and was not considered a developing
country for that reason.123 For example, China produced one-seventh of the
world’s shoes and clothing with high tariffs at the time.124 With its accession to
the WTO, several sovereigns knew that China’s success would multiply with
increased market access in world trade; therefore, China was not in need of status
as a developing country.125
The United States, Japan, and the EU were China’s largest adversaries on
the question of special treatment, but the United States was alone in demanding
that China meet every term under protocol. These demands included among
other things: a decrease of excessive tariffs, including tariffs on agricultural
products, and the implementation of more acceptable labor standards (e.g.,
higher hourly rates, no more child and prison labor, and a cap to hours one can
work in a week).126 The United States’s demands prevailed and China cut tariffs
to more than half of what they were pre-protocol.127 China also agreed to the
extension of agricultural trade beyond state-controlled trade and permitted
private parties to trade between each other.128 Ultimately, China assumed all
obligations provided by the WTO.129
C. China’s Success and Usurpation of WTO Regulations Since Its Accession
Within a decade of accession, China became the top exporter and largest
trading nation in the world.130 However, this success cannot be attributed to full
compliance with the WTO’s regulations and other agreements. China amassed
fifty-four WTO cases against it because of its questionable internal measures.131
The countries bringing these claims have often prevailed at the WTO and have
exposed unlawful Chinese practices.132 Additionally, between 2009 and 2015,

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 1480.
See id. at 1479.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1481-86.
Id. at 1512; Shaffer & Gao, supra note 14, at 130.
See Bhala, supra note 102, at 1512.
Id. at 1519.
Wu, supra note 9, at 262.
See Shaffer & Gao, supra note 14, at 128.
Wu, supra note 9, at 294.
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cases against China accounted for ninety percent of the cases raised at the
WTO.133
Some scholars explain that China’s different economic structure is what
contributes to its non-compliance.134 Specifically, the WTO is rooted in the
western ideology of liberalized trade which much of the world has adjusted to
through the WTO, but China’s entire regime would have to change to fully
comply. For example, the state owns virtually every enterprise (State Owned
Enterprise (SOE)) and “acts as the dominant economic player” in which it uses
its markets to further its political gain.135 At the same time, the WTO was
established to better regulate economic practices, including protection of the
people.
China’s government functions by its controlling political party; thus, labor
and industry associations lack power to bargain for their constituents because
the government already controls it.136 The WTO and the regulations it imposes
provide an opportunity for other nations to raise claims of these abuses not only
for their own economic benefit, but for the benefit of the people residing in the
country that is employing illegal practices.137 Finally, there is concern that the
WTO is not equipped to handle all of China’s practices and potential violations
because the sovereign’s economic structure is so different.138 China’s trading
partners believe that the WTO is successful in resolving trade disputes under its
framework, but this is true because the disputes are confined to the behavior
exhibited by other nations.139 Thus, because China is structurally different and
the WTO is founded on western liberalization, there are likely several Chinese
state practices that have gone unnoticed.
II. THE 2018 TRADE WAR
The 2018 U.S.-China Trade War stems from intellectual property violations
that China has consistently committed.140 The U.S. agricultural industry is
caught in the middle of the 2018 Trade War, which is a strategic tactic China
employs as retaliation for the U.S.’ actions. This Section describes the United
States and Chinese tactics for imposing tariffs on one another and how each state
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 263.
See id. at 261; Bhala, supra note 102, at 1469.
Wu, supra note 9, at 270.
Id. at 287–88.
Id.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 308.
U.S. TRADE REP. ANN. REP. (2017); U.S. TRADE REP. SPECIAL 301 REP. (2017).
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is counteracting the economic damage. Jennifer Hillman, a previous member of
the WTO Appellate Body and previous Commissioner of the U.S. International
Trade Commission, succinctly summarizes why the United States is involved in
a trade war with China:
China . . . is consistently acting in ways that undermine the global
system of open and fair trade. Market access barriers too numerous to
mention; forced technology transfers; intellectual property theft on an
unprecedented scale; indigenous innovation policies and the Made in
China 2025 program; discriminatory use of technical standards;
massive government subsidies that have led to chronic overcapacity in
key industrial sectors; and a highly restrictive foreign investment
regime.141

With this context, one can understand the underlying tension and leading causes
to the spark of the trade war.
A. The United States’s First Economic Strike and Its Justification
The United States began imposing fifty billion dollars in tariffs on Chinese
goods in July 2018, claiming authority under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974.142 The administration’s team of analysts and economists estimate that
China’s illegal practices concerning U.S. IP has cost the United States $50
billion annually.143 As stated previously, the Trade Act allows the U.S. Trade
Representative to discern whether any practice or act of a foreign country
burdens or restricts U.S. commerce or is unjustifiable.144 Although the
establishment of the WTO restricted unilateral action, Section 301 is
internationally permitted as a first procedural step under unilateral action.145 The
United States is permitted to investigate specific measures and respond to
requests for consultations over international restrictions.146 However, in turn, the
United States may not retaliate before WTO approval after its own request of a
WTO panel.147 Specifically, the Trade Act provides mandatory actions for the
141
Jennifer Hillman, The Best Way to Address China’s Unfair Policies and Practices Is Through A Big,
Bold Multilateral Case at the WTO, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, (June 8, 2018)
(citing Statement as delivered by Ambassador Dennis Shea, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and U.S.
permanent Representative to the WTO, WTO General Council, Geneva, May 8, 2018).
142
Walters, supra note 17.
143
Id.
144
Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. 2101 (2018); see also Walters, supra note 17.
145
Bessko, supra note 65, at 292. Also, any state can act unilaterally in circumstances that the Treaty and
Understanding establishing the WTO does not cover. Id. However, the 2018 Trade War concerns bilateral and
multilateral treaties that concern the WTO. Id.
146
Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. 2101 (2018).
147
Id.
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Trade Representative:
Sec. 301 Actions by United States Trade Representative.
(a) Mandatory Action
(1) If the United States Trade Representative determines under
section 304(a)(1) that—
(A) The rights of the United States under any trade agreement
are being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country—
(i.) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or
otherwise denies benefits to the United States under,
any trade agreement, or
(ii.) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States
commerce;
The Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection
(c) . . .148
If the Representative finds such practices, then he may take any action set
within his scope of authority as laid out in the statute.149 The U.S. government
created the Trade Representative position for transparency purposes.150
Likewise, various countries employ their own executive trade representatives
and committees, like China’s Ministry of Commerce, to signify to trading
partners that “we are watching you.”151 In the 2018 Trade War, the
administration justified its tariffs against China through the U.S. Trade
Representative under this U.S. law.152
In the early months of his tenure, President Trump announced that the United
States would begin imposing tariffs on China for not complying with the WTO
nor abiding by international trade regulations.153 His rhetoric echoes the
protectionism regime expressed years ago, but explains that the regime aligns
with WTO regulations.154 Specifically, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) released in both his WTO Compliance Annual Report and an additional

148

Id.
Id.
150
See id.
151
Hsieh, supra note 105, at 379.
152
See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. 2101 (2018); Robyn Dixon, China Challenges Fairness of
U.S. Tariffs and Asks World Trade Organization to Intervene, L.A. TIMES, (July 16, 2018, 6:56 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-wto-20180716-story.html#; see also Walters, supra note 17.
153
Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, supra note 20.
154
See McGee, supra note 18, at 540; see also Trade Wars, Trump Tariffs and Protectionism Explained,
supra note 18; Peterson, supra note 18.
149
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Special Report that China was placed on the Priority Watchlist because of
China’s constant abuses regarding misappropriation of U.S. IP through forced
technology transfer. 155 The Trade Representative explained in the Special
Report:
USTR continues to place China on the Priority Watch List because
longstanding and new IP concerns strongly merit attention. China is
home to widespread infringing activity, including trade secret theft,
rampant online piracy and counterfeiting, and high levels of physical
pirated and counterfeit exports to markets around the globe. China
imposes requirements that U.S. firms develop their IP in China or
transfer their IP to Chinese entities as a condition to accessing the
Chinese market. China also requires that mandatory adverse terms be
applied to foreign IP licensors, and requires that U.S. firms localize
research and development activities. Structural impediments to civil
and criminal IPR enforcement are also problematic, as are
impediments to pharmaceutical innovation.156

The need for priority watch and the spark of the trade war all stems from the
fact that the Chinese government owns virtually every enterprise through its
unique economic structure.157 Market access between China and the United
States regarding IP trade has allegedly been harming the U.S. economy because
both U.S. businesses in China and U.S. businesses trading with China must share
their data with the Chinese government.158
In turn, China has access to U.S. trade secrets, trademarks, and original
technology through a system that requires full access to information of every
entity that is housed in China, which causes globally unfair competition.159
Biotechnology patents, which assist the United States in maintaining their edge
in the agricultural industry, are collected under this system.160 The USTR
explains in his Report regarding China’s compliance with WTO regulations that
despite China’s policy changes for accession into the WTO, the state is now
revising revisions which conditioned its accession:
After its accession to the WTO, China undertook a wide-ranging
revision of its framework of laws and regulations aimed at protecting
the intellectual property rights (IPR) of domestic and foreign rights

155
U.S. TRADE REP. ANN. REP. (2017); U.S. TRADE REP. SPECIAL 301 REP. (2017); see Trade Wars, Trump
Tariffs and Protectionism Explained, supra note 18.
156
U.S. TRADE REP. SPECIAL 301 REP. (2017).
157
See generally Shaffer & Gao, supra note 14, at 127, 161–62.
158
U.S. TRADE REP. SPECIAL 301 REP. (2017).
159
Id.
160
Id.; What’s at Stake in the U.S.-China Agricultural-Trade War, supra note 22.
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holders, as required by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement). Currently,
China is in the midst of an extended round of revisions to these laws
and regulations. Despite various plans and directives issued by the
State Council in 2017, inadequacies in China’s IPR protection and
enforcement regime continue to present serious barriers to U.S.
exports and investment. As a result, China was again placed on the
Priority Watch List.161

China’s alleged reversion to old practices further undermines the rule of law
established by the WTO and fosters unfair trade practices.162 The United States
has a longstanding record of USTR reports explaining China’s longstanding
abuses163 and would benefit from using the reports and documentation of
attempted negotiations with China to justify its actions at the WTO.
B. China’s Retaliatory Tariffs
In today’s international economy, the United States is a front-runner in few
areas, however agriculture is an area that propels the United States to the top.164
Additionally, agriculture is the third largest U.S. export industry, meaning that
the United States makes a large net profit on the products it sends to other
countries.165 Many of the United States’ most dominant agricultural products
make China’s list of top imports and the areas in which the products are grown
represent much of Trump’s voting population; thus, revealing an ideal area for
China to retaliate against the United States.166 China initially retaliated with a
twenty-five percent tariff on $50 billion of U.S. exports, agricultural products
equaling $17 billion of the total.167

161
U.S. TRADE REP. ANN. REP. (2017); see also Bhala, supra note 102, at 1533 (explaining the several
changes that China had to make to its government policies to abide by WTO regulations and accede to the WTO);
Wu, supra note 9, at 270 (describing the challenges that China would face because of its unique government
infrastructure which allows the Chinese government to have access to every course of business in China).
162
U.S. TRADE REP. ANN. REP. (2017) (“[T]he United States has urged China to make certain key
amendments to its trade secrets-related laws and regulations, particularly with regard to a draft revision of the
Anti-unfair Competition Law.”).
163
See generally id.
164
Boudreau, supra note 7.
165
Alan Bjerga and Mario Parker, American Farmers are Losing Billions from Trump’s Trade War –But
They’re Still Supporting Him, FIN. POST (July 17, 2018), https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/
agriculture/american-farmers-are-losing-billions-from-trumps-trade-war-but-theyre-still-supporting-him.
166
Boudreau, supra note 7; Catherine Boudreau, Trump Country Hit Hard by Chinese Tariffs, POLITICO
(July 6, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/06/trump-china-tariffs-farmers-672103 [hereinafter
Boudreau, Trump Country Hit Hard by Chinese Tariffs].
167
Id.
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Just as the U.S. administration promotes protectionist measures, one could
argue that China is doing just the same, as it failed to initially negotiate or file a
claim with the WTO prior to retaliating with tariffs. A large chunk, or $19.6
billion, of the U.S. agricultural exports are exported to China, and farmers are
beginning to worry that the longstanding trade relationship with China is
crumbling to the point of no return.168 Of the $19 billion of U.S. agricultural
products exported to China in 2017, U.S. soybean and oilseed exports to China
made up $12–$14 billion.169 The depiction below demonstrates the amount of
soybeans exported from the U.S. to China in metric tons.

170

As depicted above, China is the United States’ top recipient for exported
soybeans. The soybean side of the agriculture industry between China and the
United States is as robust as it is today because of the sovereigns’ decades-long
trade relationship.171 In turn, the United States is ranked first as the world’s top
producer of soybeans, but the trade war has restrained the United States. The

168
Perspectives on U.S. Agricultural Trade, The American Farm Bureau Federation (Sept. 13, 2018);
Forrest Laws, China’s Response to Tariffs Hitting Soybean Farmers Hard, DELTA FARM PRESS (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.farmprogress.com/marketing/china-s-response-tariffs-hitting-soybean-farmers-hard.
169
Laws, supra note 168.
170
Durisin & Dodge, supra note 3 (showing where soybeans are imported and exported in metric tons to
further show the impact that the United States is experiencing from China’s tariffs against U.S. soybeans).
171
Laws, supra note 168
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United States is unable to sell the crops harvested in fall 2018 because over half
the soybean harvest was scheduled and regularly shipped to China.172
Additionally, U.S. pork is negatively-affected by the trade war because
China is a world leader in pork consumption.173 At the start of the trade war,
China placed a twenty-five percent tariff on pork.174 After the trade war festered
for about a month, China retaliated with an additional twenty-five percent tariff
on pork.175 More recently, the tariff on pork has risen to an amount of over
seventy percent on U.S. pork exports.176 Pork helps the United States
internationally dominate in the agricultural industry by bringing in almost $20
billion of revenue, but the trade war has an estimated potential loss of as much
as $911 million in just the pork industry alone.177
U.S. agriculture comprises only two percent of the United States’ total
economy, so one could argue that it is a less effective target for the Chinese
government to impose tariffs on to weaken the U.S. economy.178 However,
agriculture experts agree that U.S. agriculture is an appealing target because the
United States is dependent on agriculture exports for its economy to remain
stable.179 Additionally, strategists theorize that the Chinese government is
imposing these tariffs for political reasons to inspire the election of a new U.S.
president.180 When the United States retaliates against China’s tariffs, China
retaliates and implements new waves of tariffs, especially those tariffs targeted
toward agricultural products.181 After two months of China’s waves of tariffs
during the trade war, China has increased or placed tariffs on soybeans,

172
Keith Good, Agricultural Trade: Soybean Issues, FARM POL’Y NEWS (July 29, 2018), https://
farmpolicynews.illinois.edu/2018/07/agricultural-trade-soybean-issues/; Peterson, supra note 18.
173
Bjerga & Parker, supra note 165.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Jeff Daniels, Rising US-China Trade Tensions ‘Couldn’t Come at a Worse Time’: Iowa Agriculture
Secretary, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/19/escalation-in-trade-war-comes-at-worsetime-says-iowa-ag-official.html.
177
Donnelle Eller, Iowa Farming’s $2.2 Billion Trade Loss Could Ripple Through State’s Economy, DES
MOINES REG. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2018/09/21/trumpchina-trade-war-effects-iowa-agriculture-farming-exports-tariffs-canada-pork-soybeans-steel/1368546002/.
178
Megan Henney, American Agriculture with Tariffs, FOX BUS. (July 6, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.
com/politics/why-china-is-targeting-american-agriculture-with-tariffs.
179
What’s at Stake in the U.S.-China Agricultural-Trade War, supra note 22.
180
Henney, supra note 178; Boudreau, Trump Country Hit Hard by Chinese Tariffs, supra note 166; David
Lynch, Popularity of Tariffs on China May Lead to Political Pain for Trump, CHICAGO TRIB. (June 23, 2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/national/ct-biz-china-tariffs-analysis-20180623-story.html.
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Boudreau, Trump Country Hit Hard by Chinese Tariffs, supra note 166.
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sorghum, alfalfa, cherries, apricots, peaches, wheat, and corn, and the list
continues to grow.182
C. Circumventing the Trade War Damage
Both China and the United States are harmed by the trade war and both
parties are attempting to find other trade routes to lessen the damage they
continue to cause to their economies. The trade war between the two countries
has spiraled into a global trade war because the tariffs are affecting several other
countries.183
1. United States’ Strategy
The United States is attempting to ameliorate the agricultural issues it faces
by entering into other agreements with its allies. For example, President Trump
met with EU trade officials to make a deal to help cover some of the potential
losses from soybean production.184 However, even with the EU buying extra
soybean exports, the trade deficit will remain significant.185 The agreement
between the EU and the U.S. intends to reallocate $1.6 billion of the $12.3 billion
soybean exports which were expected to hit China’s domestic market before the
trade war; thus, an uncomfortable excess of soybeans will remain untraded.186
The United States created an aid package program to assist farmers who are
affected by the trade war. The aid package is a $12 billion subsidy to be released
in necessary installments for which farmers may apply.187 The Department of
Agriculture had paid $4.7 billion in the summer of 2018, and $3.6 billion of the
first installment had been allocated to soybean farmers.188 The U.S. government
also implemented a “Food Purchase and Distribution Program” to buy farmers’
excess products because of reduced demand from the trade war.189 Also, the U.S.
government adopted a “Trade Promotion Program” that was intended to
discover other markets of which the U.S. farming industry could trade.190

182
Shruti Date Singh & Tatiana Freitas, As Trump Settles Scores with China, American Farmers Pick Up
Tab, DELTA FARM PRESS (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.farmprogress.com/farm-policy/trump-settles-scoreschina-american-farmers-pick-tab.
183
Peterson, supra note 18.
184
Good, supra note 172.
185
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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The protectionist trade policies that the administration employs strike a
similar comparison to President Hoover’s policies leading up to World War II.
President Hoover tried to be tough on trade, but his practices produced
increasing economic disparities and subsidies while he attempted to counteract
agricultural turmoil.191 Economists say that recently-lowered soybean exports
have lowered U.S. economic growth and the trade war is hindering the U.S.
economy. Since the trade war began, U.S. trade has seen its worst contribution
to the economy in 33 years.192
For several reasons, some analysts believe that the United States should be
hesitant to file a complaint at the WTO. First, litigation resulting from the claim
may offend China and insinuate an “act of bad faith.”193 Second, trade disputes
are often seen as political conflicts rather than trade issues.194 This political
viewpoint could unite Chinese groups behind more protectionist measures and
negatively impact U.S. exporters even more.195 Third, WTO litigation could
potentially backfire resulting in higher costs in the United States for raw
materials if the WTO decides that Chinese regulations are non-compliant.196
Additionally, past U.S. government administrations have hesitated to investigate
Section 301 complaints against China.197 Bilateral talks and agreements are
mutually preferred by both parties.198 At the same time, a U.S. threat of litigation
at the WTO would likely encourage China to negotiate the ongoing dispute
between the two nations.199
2. China’s Strategy
Although the Chinese people rely on soybeans for their animal feed and
other products of consumption, there are other suppliers that China can buy from
to make up for its tariffs on U.S. soybean exports. Brazil dominates soybean
shipments when the United States is off season and Brazil has expanded its
harvest to increase its profit during the trade war.200 China’s longstanding high
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demand for soybeans has resulted in Brazil investing in more acreage and better
capabilities to grow soybeans to meet China’s demand.201 Strategists project that
the increasing tensions in the trade war would result in reliance on Brazilian
exports in the long term, and the Chinese people would substitute soybeans with
other agricultural products to compensate for the demand that Brazil cannot
supply.202
Chinese executives claim that the Chinese people stand behind them and
their actions, as evidenced by their lifestyle changes. Specifically, months into
the trade war, Chinese officials explained at an agricultural trade conference that
the Chinese people support the Chinese government and are learning how to
innovate so they can overcome the shortage of soy.203 Chinese officials have
further worried U.S. farmers in their claims that the nation is weaning itself off
U.S. soybean exports by slashing the soy in animal feed.204 Moreover, the
Chinese government has explained its plans to eliminate U.S.-imported
soybeans from China’s supply, through alternatives and by tapping into Brazil’s
market.205
D. The Argument Against Agricultural Waste
At the time of its inception, the original members of the WTO created the
organization with the intent to increase international livelihood through trade
accessibility and improve standards of living across the globe.206 States often
consider food and self-sufficiency in agriculture a critical part of their national
security.207 Agriculture is crucial for urban-poor families and those households
without farmers—these households alone spend 80% of their income on food.208
This fact is especially true for China, as the Chinese people are facing food
security issues amidst the trade war and the Chinese government fails to provide
for its people.209
The Uruguay Round of negotiations was the first time that agriculture was a
topic of discussion for inclusion in international trade.210 Analysts believe that
201
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agriculture remains to be the “the deal-maker or breaker” as it is often the subject
of multilateral trade negotiations.211 Mutual agreements regarding agriculture
presented obstacles for the GATT and WTO agreements and continues to halt
progress in the Doha Round negotiations.212 International agricultural trade has
restrictive protections because 80% of agricultural trade is for people’s
consumption.213 Therefore, food is too critical for life and development to allow
a free global market to decide distribution outcomes.214 Member states formed
the WTO with an important goal to promote food security throughout the world
and prevent food waste.215
The Agreement on Agriculture was important for the WTO to prevent food
waste and increase agricultural trade. The WTO Committee on Agriculture has
reported that specific aspects of agriculture require continuous and distinct
treatment within the WTO.216 Agriculture is the “first area [of trade] where
nearly all tariff lines are bound.”217 Under the Agreement on Agriculture,
China’s retaliatory tariffs against the U.S.’s agricultural products should be
challenged at the WTO for potential legal violations.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The U.S. Trade Representative believes that change in China will only
happen with aggressive application of U.S. guidelines and enforcement of WTO
rules by bringing claims against China.218 For example, advisors close to the
Representative explain:
[The Trade Representative] has told friends and associates that he is
intent on preventing the president from being talked into accepting
“empty promises,” like temporary increases in soybean or beef
purchases. [Mr. Lighthizer] is pushing for substantive changes, such
as forcing China to end its practice of requiring American companies
to hand over valuable technology as a condition of doing business
there. When Mr. Lighthizer senses that anyone might be going a little
soft on China, he opens a paper-clipped manila folder he totes around
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and brandishes a single-page, easy-reading chart that lists decades of
failed trade negotiations with Beijing.219

Although the Representative has years of experience in trade, the rigid
negotiation style he exudes has not been effective over the past few months and
will likely fail to foster a future result.220 Rather than handling international
matters on its own, the United States should challenge China through the WTO
with a case, ideally with countries joining to make the case multilateral, to hold
China accountable for its consistent abuses. States generally bring viable claims
which result in situations in which the complainant almost always wins, and the
responding state almost always complies.221
Despite claims that the WTO is rooted in western ideals and thus favors the
United States, the United States loses 89% of the cases brought against it and
wins 91% of the cases it brings.222 Statistics show that the United States’ winloss ratio is virtually identical to the ratios of any other country.223 China has
officially filed sixteen claims with the WTO and one more recent claim against
the United States in response to the trade war.224 Neither nation is unfamiliar
with the fact that the WTO has asserted itself in several panel hearings and the
United States has filed more than seven complaints against China at the WTO.225
The United States should file claims against China to hold China accountable
for its agricultural and IP violations. Overall, China’s actions in the trade war
specifically warrant consequences because its tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods
violate the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture.
A. The WTO’s Approach to the U.S.’s Argument Under the National Security
Exception
Although the United States began imposing tariffs as a response to China’s
alleged theft of U.S. software, the United States likely has a strong case against
China.226 This is not to say that the United States will not face repercussions
219
Alan Rappeport, As China Talks Begin, Trump’s Trade Negotiator Tries to Keep President from
Wavering, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/us/politics/robert-lighthizerpresident-trump.html.
220
Id.
221
Roger Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 697, 697–98 (2011).
222
Dixon, supra note 152; Peterson, supra note 18.
223
Peterson, supra note 18.
224
Disputes by Member, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_
country_e.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
225
Hsieh, supra note 105, at 388–90.
226
U.S. TRADE REP. SPECIAL 301 REP. (2017); What’s at Stake in the U.S.-China Agricultural-Trade War,
supra note 22.

JICHA_5.26.20

2020]

5/26/2020 3:10 PM

JINPING AND THE BEANSTALK

1059

because it failed to file a claim with the WTO initially. Specifically, in 1999, the
WTO held that economically powerful countries are not permitted to threaten
other countries with unilateral actions.227 Therefore, the United States should
face consequences when responding to China’s complaint at the WTO.
However, the United States could potentially justify its tariffs against China
under the WTO’s National Security Exception.
The U.S. administration has entertained the idea that the tariffs against China
were in response to IP theft, which the United States considers a National
Security issue.228 Article XXI states that:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to require any contracting
party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers
contrary to its essential security interests, or to prevent any contracting
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests . . . .229

The National Security Exemption categorizes security interests as national
security information, nuclear material, military goods and services, war and
international emergencies, and United Nations Charter obligations.230 The
United States’ strongest argument is found in protecting its national security
information. China’s economic structure has allegedly resulted in piracy of U.S.
intellectual property and the United States can make a strong argument that the
Chinese government has access to U.S. intelligence because of the U.S.
corporations housed in China. Thus, the WTO’s reasoning of the Exception will
be important in this case because the Organization will either allow U.S. actions
pertaining to the trade war to go unpunished, and potentially open the floodgates
for other countries to follow, or WTO panelists will use the case as an
opportunity to advocate for change in trade rules and better define the
applicability of the Exception.231
Some analysts believe that the WTO avoids addressing the National Security
Exception because the WTO would violate state sovereignty.232 The WTO
227
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would have to decide whether a sovereign’s security interest is actually a
security interest based on a standard that does not yet exist at the WTO.233
Recently, Ukraine sued Russia at the WTO because Russia allegedly impeded
agricultural exports that required railway access through Russia.234
Russia justified its blocking of the imports on the basis that Ukraine posed a
security risk to its citizens, under the Security Risk Exception, because of its
anti-Russian sentiment.235 Ukraine argued that there were other reasons, like
retaliating against the Ukraine because of Crimea, for Russia’s impediments of
imports.236 Russia submitted several pieces of evidence to the WTO showing
negative attitudes toward Russians in Ukraine that led to attacks against Russian
entities, the deaths of several people, automatic Ukrainian prosecutions against
Russian citizens for their entry into Crimea, and several other examples.237
The WTO explained that in cases in which illegal conduct is argued as
justifiable for security risk reasons, the cases should be decided on a case-bycase basis.238 The WTO reasoned that Russia did not act illegally in preventing
Ukrainian imports because of Ukraine’s anti-Russian political climate.239
Further, the WTO agreed that Russia was ensuring the health and safety of its
own employees and the Security Risk Exception was applicable.240
The United States was included as a third party to the Russian-Ukrainian
lawsuit at the WTO and commended the WTO holding in favor of Russia.241
One could argue that the WTO’s decision for Russia opened the floodgates for
a low threshold regarding the applicability of the National Security Exception.
The National Security Exception has been a known loophole stemming from
Article XXI of the GATT.242 The Exception has rarely been used, lacks any
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authoritative pronouncement as to its meaning, and welcomes creative
arguments and ambiguity in how it applies to complaints.243
The Exception has been interpreted as self-judging based on the country that
raises it, and it should be raised in good faith.244 Essentially, the self-judging
nature of the Exception places the argument outside of the domain of WTO
judicial review.245 This could explain why the WTO panel allowed Russia’s
justification for its conduct at the WTO and this interpretation may assist the
United States in justifying its own tariffs against China. The United States likely
commended the WTO’s decision for Russia because it would be favorable
precedent for the United States in the future.246 Nevertheless, the WTO
emphasized that security situations are determined on a case-by-case basis and
the United States will require more than a previous case to justify its tariffs.247
Additionally, the WTO does have “sovereignty safety valves” to address
concerns over invocations of the Security Risk Exception made in bad faith.248
Member states are able to advocate for their national objective in other ways to
prevent invocation of the Exception including: (1) the Non-Application Clause
(a country is not forced to trade with an enemy); (2) Preferential Trade
Agreements (mechanisms to compensate members for impaired or nullified
trade benefits); and (3) WTO-authorized sanctions.249 There is a general
understanding at the WTO that the National Security Exception should be used
in situations that threaten reciprocity between two states.250 The National
Security Exception should be considered a last resort.251 Historically, sovereigns
have not directly raised the National Security Exception in response to situations
where a trading partner is unreliable, but scholars believe that it is not impossible
to impose trade restrictions to protect essential security interests—it just has not
been done.252 In reply to China’s complaint at the WTO, the United States will
likely attempt to justify the tariffs against China under the National Security
Exception.
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A. U.S. Allegations will Challenge the WTO’s Ability to Handle China’s
Economic Structure
The U.S. administration claims that the WTO is incapable of handling the
unfair Chinese trade practices concerning intellectual property.253 This case will
likely challenge the WTO’s ability to address China’s unique economic
structure.254 As discussed in Section II above, China’s economic structure of
state-owned enterprises does not necessarily fit in with world trade
liberalization.255 Further, scholars explain that the only reason why China has
gotten away with its state practices as long as it has is because China’s practices
have been confined to the violations that other countries commit.256 However,
the Chinese government’s requirement that Chinese partners share their
technical innovations with the government will prove to be a new challenge for
the WTO.257 The WTO should uphold its mission to encourage fair practices,
and should handle China’s state-owned enterprise regime the same way it
applies to other nations’ corporations and their IP rights. China will likely have
to make some significant changes to its governing system to adjust to increasing
market access and international trade overall.
B. China’s Violations of the Agreement on Agriculture
China’s tariffs on U.S. agricultural products violate the Agreement on
Agriculture because the actions threaten the livelihood of farmers and hinder
international economic efficiency.258 WTO members created the Agreement on
Agriculture to “increase market access and improve the livelihoods of farmers
around the world.”259 As such, member states must notify WTO officials and the
affected government of proposed tariffs and abide by a tariff schedule prior to
official implementation.260 The United States has followed these procedures by
notifying the appropriate parties and individuals of its tariff plans, whereas
China’s retaliation was immediate and left the U.S. farming industry without
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time to accommodate and negotiate.261 Even though China has filed sixteen
complaints against the United States with the WTO’s dispute settlement body as
of October 2018, China should have waited for the WTO to take action instead
of retaliating with its own tariffs on U.S. agriculture to further maintain the
international rule of law.262
Additionally, China’s tariffs on soybeans specifically violate the Bilateral
Concession Agreement with the United States, which conditioned China’s
accession to the WTO in addition to the specific protections inherent in the
Agreement on Agriculture.263 Before its accession to the WTO, China agreed to
phase out all tariffs on soybean exports to increase market access.264 China’s
specific targeting of soybeans in the trade war violated this initiative set out in
the longstanding agreement. The Agreement on Agriculture places protections
on specific agricultural products and oilseeds are one of the few with specific
protections from tariffs.265 Soybeans are categorized as an oilseed and therefore
demand protection from unscheduled and excessive tariffs.266 Whether the
tariffs are excessive is for the WTO to decide, but the negative effects on the
U.S. farmers expose a level of severity in which the excessiveness of agricultural
tariffs, on soybeans especially, is likely.
The Agreement on Agriculture aims to prevent food waste by its promotion
of increased market access through the WTO as a global trade system.267
Because of China’s agricultural tariffs, U.S. farmers are not able to sell their soy
crops at cost because there is no longer a market.268 Farmers are trying to
stockpile their crops, but the potential for food waste is a constant concern.269
The Chinese people may face a food security issue because the resulting tariffs
result in less food supplies and higher prices as well.270
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The strongest criticism against this paper proposing that the United States
should file a claim regarding China’s agricultural tariffs against the United
States is found in the international general principle to negotiate in good faith.271
Specifically, the principle calls on sovereigns to do their best to solve disputes
through direct negotiations and resolutions.272 Even though China and the
United States are attempting to work through their differences and reach an
agreement between January 2019 and March 2019, this Comment still advocates
for claims of past violations to be filed with the WTO.273 Such claims may
worsen negotiations, but failing to hold China and the United States accountable
for their respective questionable agricultural tariffs and unilateral action
undermines the rule of law and sends a message that economic powers can get
away with their abuses. Moreover, it is important that the WTO settle the dispute
so that the IP and agricultural abuses central to the trade war present a first
impression at the WTO and inspire new precedent for all sovereigns.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, other countries would join the United States in filing a claim against
China for its WTO regulation abuses. One of the WTO Dispute Resolution
Panel’s previous judges, Jennifer Hillman, called upon the United States to build
a large case against China so other countries can join in the allegations.274 This
approach in combination with the United States’ desire to aggressively apply
WTO rules show a sense of solidarity in the international community in
correcting past wrongs.275 The United States has filed claims and won at the
WTO for past abuses and should do the same regarding China’s agricultural
tariffs.276 It is important that the United States file against China so that other
countries feel they can be successful and not suffer from retaliatory tariffs.277
Some analysts agree that the 2018 Trade War would be the case for the WTO
to handle the “deep connection between the ruling Communist party and
commercial institutions” and force the institutions to “privatize, become more
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efficient, and compete on a level playing field.”278 The WTO will have to reform
or even create new trade rules to evolve with new technology and data.
Ultimately, the WTO’s addressing of the 2018 Trade War will be a success for
the international community because the Organization would have to reckon
with China’s economic system and establish how it fits in the global community.
The holding at the WTO would result in more fair and transparent international
practices.
More recently, the United States and China set a schedule to negotiate over
a specific span of time so they may reach an agreement without outside
interference.279 While this returns to the general principle of good faith
negotiations, this comment still advocates for action from the WTO.280 The
United States should file a claim against China to not only protect its alleged
security interest IP rights, but to show the world that even something as essential
as agriculture still requires protection. In turn, the WTO should be firm in its
consequences for China’s tariffs against agriculture to preserve the livelihood of
farmers in all parts of the world and to protect the food interests of individuals.
Ultimately, should the United States utilize the WTO, it will likely inspire other
sovereigns to follow suit and further lead to an international community that
better respects the rule of law.
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